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Abstract— Distributed Denial of Service (DoS) attacks is one 
of the major threats and among the hardest security 
problems in the Internet world.  In this paper, we study the 
impact of a UDP flood attack on TCP throughputs, round-
trip time, and CPU utilization on the latest version of 
Windows and Linux platforms, namely, Windows Server 
2012 and Linux Ubuntu 13. This paper also evaluates several 
defense mechanisms including Access Control Lists (ACLs), 
Threshold Limit, Reverse Path Forwarding (IP Verify), and 
Network Load Balancing.  Threshold Limit defense gave 
better results than the other solutions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has become increasingly important to 
current society; it has revolutionized our way of 
communication, doing business, and it has made 
information publicly and easily accessible. However, with 
all the advantages of the Internet, there are also some 
disadvantages. There is no absolute security in the Internet 
world, and the hackers can use the Internet to launch 
different types of attacks on a victim, one of which is 
known as a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.   
A DDoS Attack is one of the most common and major 
threat to the Internet in which the goal of the attacker is to 
consume computer resources of the victim, usually by 
sending a high volume of seemingly legitimate traffic 
requesting some services from the victim. As a result, it 
creates network congestion on the way from a source to the 
target, thus disrupting its normal Internet operation [1]. 
In particular, a UDP flood attack occurs when an 
attacker crafts numerous packets to random destination 
ports on the victims system. The victim system, on receipt 
of the UDP packet would respond with appropriate ICMP 
packets, if the port is closed. A very large number of packet 
responses would slow down the system or crash [2]. 
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of a UDP flood 
attack on a web server with the new generation of 
Windows or Linux platforms, namely, Windows Server 
2012, and Linux Ubuntu 13. This paper also evaluates the 
existing defense mechanisms such as Access Control Lists 
[3], Threshold Limit [4], IP Verify [5], and Network Load 
Balancing [6].  
ACLs, Threshold Limit and IP Verify techniques are 
implemented on the routers, denying unwanted traffic 
entering the network. ACL is configured to stop the attack 
by blocking all private IP addresses since these addresses 
cannot be used on the Internet [3]. Threshold Limit stops 
the attacks by limiting the traffic rate up to the threshold 
for all incoming traffics, in this study, 10,000 packets per 
second. IP Verify technique enables routers to verify the 
reachability of source IP addresses before they can enter 
the network [4]. If the source IP address is not valid, the 
packet is dropped. Network Load Balancing technique, on 
the other hand, is implemented on individual servers. It 
does not stop unwanted traffic entering the network; it can 
only reduce the impact of attacks by balancing the attack 
traffic to an additional server using different paths and 
cables.  
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next 
section, the related work of DDoS Attacks is discussed. 
Section three covers the experimental setup and hardware 
specification. Section four covers information regarding 
the traffic measurement and data generating tools. Section 
five covers the evaluation of a UDP flood attack and 
defenses, and the last sections include the conclusions and 
future works.  
II. RELATED WORK
Analysis and comparison of DDoS Attack and defense 
mechanisms on different operating systems has been 
conducted by a number of researchers. 
In 2006, Pack and colleagues [7] investigated the 
efficiency of Access Control List against the DDoS Attack. 
The result shows that the number of ACL rules affects the 
collateral damage (legitimate traffic was dropped 
unintentionally). With 5 ACL rules, the number of the 
collateral damage was 45%. However, this number 
significantly reduced to 15% if 50 ACL rules were used.  
In 2009, Lu and colleagues [8] investigated the impact 
a UDP flood attack on the system by using metrics such as 
packet loss rate, delay, and jitter. The testbed consists of 9 
routers and 14 computers with Intel Celeron 2.1 GHz and 
512 KB memory running Linux. Iperf was a primary tool 
used to generate UDP traffic at 10, 15, 20 and 30Mbps. 
The result shows that without the attack there was no 
packet loss, and the delay jitter value was 32.3%. During a 
UDP flood attack, however, the number of packet loss 
went up to 14.08% while the jitter slightly decreased to 
29.7%. 
 In 2009, Rui and colleagues [9] conducted a study of 
DDoS prevention based on IP Verify and Threshold Limit.   
The simulation program in this study was .net 2005 
running on Windows Server 2003 system and the total 
number of IP addresses tested was 12,960,000 IP addresses. 
In 2011, Subramani [4] conducted an experiment on 
TCP and a UDP flood attack and proposed 2 defense 
mechanisms namely Access Control Lists and Threshold 
Limit. The results show that without the attack, the average 
response time of the server was 0.834 milliseconds while 
during the attack this number increased to 8.782 
milliseconds. After using Access Control Lists, the 
average response time went down to 1.093 milliseconds, 
and it reduced to 6.985 milliseconds when using Threshold 
Limit.   
 In 2012, Kaur and colleagues [10] conducted an 
experiment on DDoS Attack using a DETER testbed. The 
network in this experiment consisted of three computers: 
an attacker computer, legitimate computer, and FTP server. 
The purpose of this research was to study the impact of the 
user throughput between computer nodes during a UDP 
flood attack. Traffic result shows that the average 
bandwidth before the attack was around 75Kbps while 
during the attacks, the average bandwidth has raised 
around 130Kbps.  
In 2014 [11], we studied the TCP SYN DDoS attack and 
defense prevention mechanisms. We compared various 
defense mechanisms for preventing potential TCP SYN 
DDoS attacks. Router based TCP Intercept is found to 
provide the best defense while Anti DDoS Guardian gave 
the worst defense. 
There has been no work done on testing performance 
and defense mechanisms between Windows Server 2012 
and Linux Ubuntu 13. The lack of available research on 
impact of DDoS Attack on new generation of Windows 
and Linux platforms, and the need to develop suitable 
solution to address the rising cases of DDoS attacks on the 
computer networks were the main motivation behind this 
paper.  
III. EXPERIMENT SETUP 
The test-bed diagram for site to site is displayed in Figure 
1. The test-bed hardware setup remained constant for all 
experiments conducted. The only exception was the 
Networking Load Balancing (NLB) in which additional 
server was added to the switch to configure an IP cluster 
used as a “shared” IP address between two servers. By 
using this “shared” IP address, a client automatically 
connects to the server that has the higher priority first. In 
this study, the 50:50 rule was used, therefore, when a large 
number of attack packets entered the network, NLB shared 
the traffic to both server equally.  
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Figure 1: Network testbed. 
The network was setup through a direct gigabit Ethernet 
connection using a standard category 5e cabling between 
workstations. The router with a 100 Mbps port was used to 
separate two networks, and used to monitor incoming and 
outgoing traffic between networks. There were four types 
of workstations in the test-bed: Two workstations will act 
as attackers, one will act as a victim, and another one is 
used as a monitoring machine. 
The workstations where the attackers perform have 
BackTrack5 R3 installed while the victim machine has 
Windows server 2012 or Linux Ubuntu 13 installed. The 
monitoring PC in which Windows 8 installed is where the 
different varieties of monitoring tools installed to gather 
data and perform the network testing analysis  
The hardware benchmark comprised of an Intel® 
Core™ i5 2.80 GHz processor with 8.00 GB RAM for the 
efficient operation of operating systems, Cisco 2811 and 
Cisco SG 200 were chosen as the network connection 
devices.   
IV.   DATA GENERATION AND TRAFFIC 
MEASUREMENT TOOL 
TCPing [12] was the primary tool used to investigate the 
latency of the web server during the attack. Latency is a 
measure of time delay experienced in a system. By using 
TCPing we can measure the response times and hence we 
have calculated the latency of the victim computer. 
Iperf [13] was selected as the tool to measure the user 
throughput and packet loss during the attack. Iperf has a 
client and server functionality, and can measure the 
throughput between the two ends, either unidirectional or 
bi-directionally. It is open source software and runs on 
various platforms including Linux, and Windows.  
Hping3 [14] was chosen as an attacker generator, which 
is a built-in tool that is offered with Linux Back Track R3. 
HPing3 allows users to generate different types of DDoS 
attacks including UDP, TCP, and Smurf attack.  
Webstress Server Tool [16] was used to generate 
legitimate traffic. It is software for load and performance 
testing of a webserver. Webstress Server Tool is designed 
to simulate multiple users accessing to a website.  
All performance evaluation tests were run for 5 minutes, 
which generated the attack traffic at approximately 3 
million packets per run. The attack rate was set to 17000 
packets per second while the packet size was 512 Bytes per 
packet.  The legitimate traffic was generated by Webstress 
Server Tool, which generate the connection request from 
users to the webserver assuming on average 10 users per 
second. To ensure high data accuracy, each test was 
repeated at least 30 times and data average and runs 
continued until standard deviation of results was below 
0.07% of the average.   
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The experiments were conducted to evaluate and compare 
TCP throughputs, round-trip time and CPU utilization 
before and during the attack on a web server with 
Windows Server 2012 or Linux Ubuntu 13. This section 
also evaluates four defense mechanisms, namely, Access 
Control Lists, Threshold Limit, IP Verify, and Network 
Load Balancing.  
A. Impact of a UDP flood attack on Windows Server 2012 
and Linux Ubuntu 13. 
Figure 2 presents the TCP throughput results of 
Windows Server 2012 and Linux Ubuntu 13. On the whole, 
Linux Ubuntu 13 outperformed Windows Server 2012 in 
terms of throughput values before and during the attack.  
The result shows that the TCP throughput value before the 
attack on the Linux platform was constant at 94 Mbps, 
which was higher than Windows at about 85 Mbps. During 
the attack, the TCP throughput value on Linux platform 
significantly dropped to 0.45 Mbps, while the TCP 
throughput on Windows reduced to 0.24Mbps. 
 
Figure 2: TCP throughput comparison between Linux Ubuntu 
13 and Windows Server 2012 
A plausible speculation that could explain the reason 
why Linux Ubuntu 13 outperformed Windows 2012 is 
probably due to the way kernel network buffers are 
allocated and used by Linux platforms [15]. That is, Linux 
has a pre-allocation of fixed-sized memory buffers so that 
when a network application transmits data, these buffers 
are used to avoid the overhead associated with buffer 
allocations.   
 
Figure 3: Comparison of RTT results between two operating 
systems before and during attack. 
Figure 3 shows the round-trip time comparison between 
Windows Server 2012 and Linux Ubuntu 13. On the whole, 
the result shows that Microsoft Server 2012 had higher 
delay values than Linux Ubuntu 13. Without the attack, the 
average RTT of Windows platform was 0.99ms, while the 
average RTT of Linux platform was 0.62ms. During the 
attack, the RTT of Windows Server 2012 went up 
significantly from 0.99ms to 27.38ms, while the RTT of 
Linux Ubuntu 13 increased from 0.62ms to 26.42ms. 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of CPU Utilization between two 
operating systems before and during attack.  
 
Figure 4 illustrates the CPU utilization before and during 
a UDP flood attack. In terms of Windows Server 2012, the 
CPU usage before the attack was constant at 1% to 2%. 
During the attack, however, the CPU utilization went up 
approximately 10% within 2 seconds and increased to 22% 
in 4 seconds. Afterwards, it fluctuated between 19% and 
24%.         
In terms of Linux Ubuntu 13, the result shows that the CPU 
usage before the attack was slightly lower than for 
Windows, which was around 0.3 to 0.7%. During the 
attack, Linux Ubuntu 13 demonstrated the better 
performance in terms of stability; the CPU utilization 
increased at approximately 6% within 2 seconds. 
Afterwards, it remained steady at 23.5% to 24.9%. 
 
B.  Evaluation of DDoS defenses on Windows Server 2012  
and Linux Ubuntu 13 
Figure 5 shows the impact of the UDP flood attack on TCP 
throughputs using Windows Server 2012 after using 
defenses, namely, ACLs, Threshold Limit, IP Verify, and 
Network Load Balancing. 
 
Figure 5: TCP throughput on Windows Server 2012 after using 
defenses mechanisms.  
      The TCP throughput value before the attack was stable 
at around 86 to 86.6 Mbps. During the attack, it 
significantly dropped to 0.19 Mbps. In this study, Network 
Load Balancing technique was the worst performer, barely 
improving the throughput value from 0.19 to 0.251 Mbps. 
This was due to the fact that, in contrast to other three 
techniques, NLB did not stop unwanted traffic entering the 
network; it balanced the attack traffic to an additional 
server, therefore, allowing attacker to consume entire 
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network bandwidth by sending more attack packets. NLB 
was also the most expensive defense solution as it required 
additional server and cables. Comparing the three defences 
implemented on the router, Threshold Limit offered the 
most effective defense, in which the number of throughput 
values before the attack and after using the defense was 
almost the same, about 86.60 Mbps, outperforming other 
defense techniques by large margin. ACLs came in second, 
increasing the TCP throughput value from 0.19 Mbps to 
18.48 Mbps, followed closely by IP Verify which 
increased TCP throughputs to 15.67 Mbps.  
The huge gap in performance between the three 
defences, implemented on the router, was due to the fact 
that Threshold Limit allows all packets to enter the 
network but limits the traffic rate up to a flexible threshold, 
therefore maintaining a steady flow of packets and the 
traffic fluctuations. The main disadvantages of this defense 
technique is the fact that both legitimate and attack packets 
could be dropped when the packet rate exceed the upper 
rate, resulting in a higher collateral compared to other 
defense techniques. 
ACLs, and IP Verify are both effective defense when 
attackers use private IP addresses, or unreachable IP 
addresses respectively, but they cannot block attacking 
traffic if attackers use legitimate IP addresses not on the 
black list. 
 
 
       Figure 6: TCP throughput on Linux Ubuntu 13 after using 
defenses mechanisms.  
       Figure 6 presents the TCP throughput values after 
using defenses on Linux Ubuntu 13. The result shows that 
the TCP throughput value before the attack was stable at 
94.1 Mbps. During the attack, the TCP throughput 
significantly dropped to 0.36 Mbps.       
The most effective defense in this study was also 
Threshold Limit in which the number of throughput values 
before the attack and after using solutions were almost the 
same, at 94 Mbps. ACLs came in second, and increased 
the throughput value from 0.36 Mbps to 53.37 Mbps, while 
Network Load Balancing and IP Verify increased the 
throughput to 47.39 Mbps and 46.93 Mbps, respectively.  
Overall, similar trend compared to Windows Server 2012 
but surprisingly both ACLs, and IP Verify, offered about 
three times better performance on Linux Ubuntu 13 
compared to Windows Server 2012.  
 
Figure 7: RTT comparison after using DDoS defenses. 
Figure 7 shows the comparison of round-trip time after 
using DDoS defenses on Windows Server 2012 and Linux 
Ubuntu13. On the whole, the result shows that Linux 
Ubuntu 13 produced the delay values lower than Windows 
Server 2012.  
In terms of defenses mechanisms, IP Verify was the most 
effective defense among the other defenses, which reduced 
the RTT of Windows from 27.384ms to 26.746ms, and 
from 26.422ms to 25.604ms for Linux. Threshold Limit 
came in second, which reduced RTT of Windows to 
26.39ms and 25.98ms for Linux Ubuntu 13. 
Access Control List came in third, which reduced the RTT 
of Windows to 26.677ms and 26.007ms for Linux Ubuntu 
13. Interestingly, Network Load Balancing resulted in the 
highest RTT, which was 28.973ms for Windows and 
26.487ms for Linux. It can be noted that this number was 
even higher than the number of RTT during the attack. The 
reason behind is that the load-balancing solution requires 
system resources to examine incoming packets and make 
load-balancing decisions, and thus impose an overhead on 
network performance [6].  
 
Figure 8: CPU utilization on Windows Server 2012 after 
using defenses mechanisms. 
Figure 8 illustrates the average CPU utilization before 
and after using defenses on Windows Server 2012. The 
result shows that the CPU usage before the attack was 
stable at around 1%. During the attack, the CPU usage 
fluctuated between 19% and 24%.  
The most effective defense in this study was the Threshold 
Limit, which decreased the CPU utilization from 24% to 
3%. ACLs came in second, and reduced the CPU usage 
from 24% to 16%. Network Load Balancing decreased the 
CPU usage to approximately 18%. This figure was similar 
to IP Verify, which reduced the server’s CPU to 20%.  
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Figure 9: CPU utilization on Linux Ubuntu 13 after using 
defenses mechanisms. 
Figure 9 illustrates the average CPU utilization after 
using defenses on Linux Ubuntu 13. The results show that 
the CPU usage before the attack was stable at around 0.3 
to 0.7%. During the attack, the CPU usage of Linux 
platform fluctuated between 23% and 25%.  
The most effective defense in this study was Threshold 
Limit, which decreased the CPU utilization to 3%. IP 
Verify came in second, and reduced the CPU usage from 
25% to 10%. In terms of ACLs, the CPU usage went down 
from 25% to 15%, while Network Load Balancing reduced 
the server’s CPU usage to 18%. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we study the impact of a UDP flood attack 
on Windows Server 2012 and Linux Ubuntu 13. The result 
shows that Linux Ubuntu 13 outperformed Windows 
Server 2012 in terms of TCP throughput values, the RTT, 
and CPU utilization. In terms of TCP throughput, the result 
shows that Linux produced 8Mbps higher throughput 
values than Windows (before attack) and 0.2Mbps more 
bandwidth during the attack. The RTT result shows that 
Windows had higher delay values than Linux before attack 
(0.99ms  vs 0.62ms) and during attack (27.38ms vs 
26.44ms) . The CPU usage result shows that Windows OS 
utilized the CPU higher that Linux OS. Before the attack, 
Linux OS utilized the CPU at 0.7%, while Windows OS 
utilized the CPU at 2%. During the attack, the CPU 
utilization of Windows and Linux OS went up to 24% and 
23%, respectively.  Among four defense mechanisms 
studied, IP Verify and Threshold Limit gave better results 
than the other solutions. They could effectively increase 
the bandwidth almost to the pre-attack level. On the other 
hand, Network Load Balancing had the lowest results in 
both studies.  
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